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Appendix. Formal Theories of Parthood 
Achille C. Varzi 
 
This Appendix gives a brief overview of the main formal theories of parthood, or 
mereologies, to be found in the literature.1 The focus is on classical theories, so the 
survey is not meant to be exhaustive. Moreover, it does not cover the many philo-
sophical issues relating to the endorsement of the theories themselves, concerning 
which the reader is referred to the Selected Bibliography at the end of the volume. In 
particular, we shall be working under the following simplifying assumptions:2 
— Absoluteness: Parthood is a two-place relation; it does not hold relative to time, 
space, spacetime regions, sortals, worlds, or anything else.3 
— Monism: There is a single relation of parthood that applies to every entity inde-
pendently of its ontological category.4 
— Precision: Parthood is not a source of vagueness: there is always a fact of the mat-
ter as to whether the parthood relation obtains between any given pair of things.5 
For definiteness, all theories will be formulated in a standard first-order language 
with identity, supplied with a distinguished binary predicate constant, ‘P’, to be in-
terpreted as the parthood relation. The underlying logic will be the classical predi-
cate calculus. 
1 Core Principles  
As a minimal requirement on ‘P’, it is customary to assume that it stands for a partial 
order—a reflexive, transitive, and antisymmetric relation:6 
(P.1) Pxx   Reflexivity 
(P.2) (Pxy ∧ Pyz) → Pxz Transitivity 
(P.3) (Pxy ∧ Pyx) → x = y Antisymmetry 
Together, these three axioms are meant to fix the intended meaning of the parthood 
predicate. They form the “core” of any standard mereological theory, and the theory 
                                                      
1 The exposition follows Varzi (2014). For a thorough survey, see Simons (1987). 
2 The labels and formulations of these assumptions are from Sider (2007).  
3 For the view that parthood should be a three-place relation relativized to time, see e.g. Thomson 
(1983). For the view that it should be a four-place relation, see Gilmore (2009). 
4 For misgivings about Absoluteness and related worries, see e.g. Mellor (2006) and McDaniel (2009). 
5 For mereologies that allow for indeterminate or “fuzzy” parthood relations, see e.g. Smith (2005) 
and Polkowski (2011). 
6 Unless otherwise specified, all formulas are to be understood as universally closed. 
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that comprises just them is called Ground Mereology, or M for short.7 A number of ad-
ditional mereological predicates may then be introduced by definition: 
(1) EQxy =df Pxy ∧ Pyx equality  
(2) PPxy  =df Pxy ∧ ¬x = y proper parthood8  
(3) PExy  =df Pyx ∧ ¬x = y proper extension  
(4) Oxy  =df ∃z (Pzx ∧ Pzy) overlap  
(5) Uxy  =df ∃z (Pxz ∧ Pyz) underlap  
Given (P.1)–(P.3), it follows immediately that EQ is an equivalence relation. More-
over, PP and PE are irreflexive, asymmetric, and transitive whereas O and U are re-
flexive and symmetric, but not transtive. Since the following is a also theorem of M, 
(6) Pxy ↔ (PPxy ∨ x = y)   
‘PP’ could have been used as a primitive instead of ‘P’. Similarly for ‘PE’. Sometimes 
‘P’ is also defined in terms of ‘O’ via the biconditional 
(7) Pxy ↔ ∀z(Ozx → Ozy). 
However, (7) is not provable in M and calls for stronger axioms (specifically, the ax-
ioms of theory EM defined below). Since those stronger axioms reflect substantive 
philosophical theses, ‘P’ and ‘PP’ (or ‘PE’) are the best options to start with. Here we 
stick to ‘P’. 
 
Figure 1. Basic patterns of mereological relations. (Shaded cells indicate parthood). 
2 Decomposition Principles 
M is standardly viewed as embodying the common core of any mereological theory. 
Yet not every partial order qualifies as parthood, and establishing what further re-
                                                      
7 For a survey of the motivations that may lead to the development of non-standard mereologies in 
which P is weaker than a partial order, see Varzi (2014: §2.1). 
8 In the literature, proper parthood is sometimes defined as asymmetric parthood: PPxy =df Pxy ∧ ¬Pyx. 
Given Antisymmetry, this definition is equivalent to (2). Without Antisymmetry, however, the two defi-
nitions would come apart. (Similarly for ‘PE’.) See Cotnoir (2010). 
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quirements should be added to (P.1)–(P.3) is precisely the question a good mereo-
logical theory is meant to answer.  
One way to extend M is by means of decomposition principles, i.e., principles concern-
ing the part structure of a given whole. Here, one fundamental intuition is that no 
whole can have a single proper part. There are several ways in which this intuition 
can be captured, beginning with the following: 
(P.4a) PPxy → ∃z(PPzy ∧ ¬z = x)  (Weak) Company 
(P.4b) PPxy → ∃z(PPzy ∧ ¬Pzx)  Strong Company 
(P.4) PPxy → ∃z(PPzy ∧ ¬Ozx)  (Weak) Supplementation9 
(P.4a) is the literal rendering of the idea in question, but it is too weak: it rules out 
certain implausible finitary models (Fig. 2, left) but not, for example, models with 
infinitely descending chains in which the additional parts do not leave any mereolog-
ical “remainder” (Fig. 2, center). (P.4b) is stronger, but it still admits of models in 
which a whole can be decomposed into several proper parts all of which overlap one 
another (Fig. 2, right). In such cases it is unclear what would be left of the whole 
upon the removal of any of its proper parts (along with all proper parts thereof). It is 
only (P.4) that appears to capture the full spirit of the above-mentioned intuition: 
every proper part must be “supplemented” by another part—a proper part that is 
completely disjoint (i.e., does not overlap) the first. (P.4) entails both (P.4a) and 
(P.4b) and rules out each of the models in Fig. 2. The extension of M obtained by 
adding this principle to (P.1)–(P.3) is called Minimal Mereology, or MM.10 
 
Figure 2. Three unsupplemented models. (Connecting lines going upwards indicate proper parthood.) 
There is another, stronger way of expressing the supplementation intuition. It corre-
sponds to the following axiom, which differs from (P.4) in the antecedent:  
(P.5) ¬Pyx → ∃z(Pzy ∧ ¬Ozx)  Strong Supplementation 
In M this principle entails (P.4). The converse, however, does not hold, as shown by 
                                                      
9 In the literature, this principle is sometimes formulated using ‘P’ in place of ‘PP’ in the consequent. 
In M the two formulations are equivalent.  
10 Strictly speaking, in MM (P.3) is redundant, as it follows from (P.4) along with (P.1) and (P.2). 
For ease of reference, however, we shall continue to treat (P.3) as an axiom. 
   4  
the model in Fig. 3. The stronger mereological theory obtained by adding (P.5) to 
the three core principles of M is called Extensional Mereology, EM. 
 
Figure 3. A weakly supplemented model violating strong supplementation. 
The extensional character of EM may not be manifest in (P.5) itself, but it becomes 
clearer in view of the following theorem: 
(8) ∃zPPzx → (∀z(PPzx → PPzy) → Pxy) 
from which it follows that sameness of mereological composition is both necessary 
and sufficient for identity: 
(9) ∃zPPzx → (x=y ↔ ∀z(PPzx ↔ PPzy)). 
Thus, EM is “extensional” precisely insofar as it rules out any model of the sort de-
picted in Fig. 3, where distinct objects decompose into the same proper parts. 
There is yet a further way of capturing the supplementation intuition. It corresponds 
to the following axioms, which differs from (P.5) in the consequent: 
(P.6) ¬Pyx → ∃z∀w(Pwz ↔ (Pwy ∧ ¬Owx)). Complementation11 
Informally, (P.6) states that whenever an object fails to include another among its 
parts, there is something that amounts exactly to the difference or relative complement 
between the first object and the second. Once again, it is easily checked that in M 
this principle entails (P.5)—thus, a fortiori, (P.4)—whereas the converse does not 
hold (Fig. 4). 
 
Figure 4. A strongly supplemented model violating complementation. 
It should be noted, however, that (P.6) goes beyond the original supplementation 
intuition. For while it guarantees that a whole cannot have a single proper part, it 
                                                      
11 In the literature, (P.6) is also known as the Remainder Principle.  
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also pronounces on the specific mereological makeup of the supplementary part. In 
particular, it requires the relative complement to exist regardless of its internal 
structure. If, for example, y is a wine glass and x the stem of the glass, (P.6) entails 
the existence of something composed exactly of the base and the bowl—a spatially 
disconnected entity. Whether there exist entities of this sort, and more generally 
whether the remainder between a whole and any one of its proper parts adds up to a 
bona fide entity of its own, is really a question about mereological composition, over 
and above the conditions on decomposition set by (P.4) and (P.5).  
Before turning to issues regarding composition, a different sort of decomposition 
principles is worth mentioning. Let a mereological atom be any entity with no prop-
er parts: 
(10) Ax =df ¬∃yPPyx. atom 
Obviously, all the theories considered so far are compatible with the existence of 
such things. But one may want to demand more than mere compatibility, just as one 
may want to preclude it. Thus, one may want to require that everything is ultimately 
composed of atoms, or else that everything is made up of “atomless gunk”12 that di-
vides forever into smaller and smaller parts. These two options are usually formulat-
ed as follows: 
(P.7) ∃y(Ay ∧ Pyx) Atomicity 
(P.8) ∃yPPyx  Atomlessness 
These postulates are mutually inconsistent, but taken in isolation they can consistent-
ly be added to any mereological theory mentioned so far to yield either an atomistic 
variant or an atomless variant, respectively.  
Atomistic mereologies admit significant semplifications in the axiomatics. For exam-
ple, Atomistic EM can be simplified by merging Strong Supplementation (P.5) and At-
omicity (P.7) into a single axiom:  
(P.5ʹ′) ¬Pxy → ∃z(Az ∧ Pzx ∧ ¬Pzy) Atomistic Supplementation 
and the the extensionality thesis (9) can be put more perspicuously as follows: 
(9ʹ′) x=y ↔ ∀z(Az → (Pzx ↔ Pzy)) 
This is especially significant if one considers that (P.7) does not quite say that every-
thing is made up of atoms; it merely says that everything has atomic parts, which is 
consistent with the possibility of infinitely descending chains of decomposition that 
                                                      
12 The phrase is from Lewis (1991: 20). 
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never bottom out (Fig. 5). Whether stronger versions of (P.7) can be formulated 
that rule out such dubious patterns is, at the moment, a question that has not been 
fully explored.13  
 
Figure 5. An infinitely descending atomistic model. 
Concerning atomless mereologies, one may similarly remark that (P.8) is by itself 
rather weak. For one thing, the unsupplemented model in Fig. 2, middle, qualifies 
as atomless. To the extent that such models run afoul of the intended notion of a 
gunky world, this means that (P.8) calls for teories at least as strong as MM, in 
which case the relevant axiomatization may again be simplified by merging (P.4) and 
(P.8) into a single axiom: 
(P.4ʹ′) Pxy → ∃z(PPzy ∧ (Ozx → x = y)) Atomless Supplementation 
Moreover, infinite divisibility is loose talk. Given (P.8), gunk may have as few as de-
numerably many parts; but can it have more? Is there an upper bound on the cardi-
nality on the number of pieces of gunk? Should it be allowed that for every cardinal 
number there may be more than that many pieces of gunk? (P.8) is silent on these 
questions, yet these are certainly aspects of atomless mereology that deserve further 
scrutiny.  
3 Composition Principles 
The other main way of extending M is via composition principles, i.e. principles gov-
erning the behavior of P in the bottom-up direction: from the parts to the wholes 
that they compose. We have already seen that the Complementation axiom (P.6) is, in 
a way, a principle of this sort. Another such principle would be the dual of Atomless-
ness, to the effect that everything might be “worldless junk”14 that composes forever 
into greater and greater wholes: 
(P.9) ∃yPPxy  Ascent 
Both (P.6) and (P.9) are consistent with any of the theories considered so far. They 
are, however, fairly strong principles, which reflect specific views on the overall 
                                                      
13 See Cotnoir (2013) for some work in this direction. 
14 The phrase is from Schaffer (2010: 64). 
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mereological structure of the universe. More generally, it is customary to consider 
ways of extending M by means of composition principles that specify the conditions 
under which one or more things qualify as parts of a larger whole.15  
The most basic principles of this sort have the following form, to the effect that for 
any pair of suitably related entities, i.e., any two entities satisfying a given provision 
ξ, there is something of which both are part—an underlapper: 
(P.10) ξxy → Uxz ξ-Bound 
Such principles are quite weak. For example, regardless of how exactly ξ is con-
strued, (P.10) is trivially satisfied in any model that includes a universal entity of 
which everything is part. 
A stronger sort of requirement is that any pair of suitably related entities have a min-
imal underlapper, something composed of their parts and nothing else. There are at 
least three ways of formulating such a requirement, corresponding to three different 
ways of characterizing the relevant notion of a minimal underlapper, also known as a 
mereological sum of the two entities in question:16 
(11a) Sazxy =df Pxz ∧ Pyz ∧ ∀w((Pxw ∧ Pyw) → Pzw) a-sum17 
(11b) Sbzxy =df Pxz ∧ Pyz ∧ ∀w(Pwz → (Oxw ∨ Oyw)) b-sum 
(11c) Sczxy =df ∀w(Owz ↔ (Oxw ∨ Oyw)) c-sum 
In M these three notions are pairwise distinct (Fig. 6), though they may coincide in 
the presence of further axioms. For instance, given Strong Supplementation, (11b) and 
(11c) are equivalent (though stronger that (11a)), whereas in the presence of Comple-
mentation all three notions coincide so long as there is a universal entity: in that case, 
each sum of any two things is just the complement of the difference between the 
complement of one minus the other. (Such is the strength of (P.6)—a genuine cross 
between decomposition and composition principles.) 
 
Figure 6. An a-sum that is not a b- or c-sum, and a c-sum that is not an a- or b-sum.18 
                                                      
15 This is a version of the so-called “Special Composition Question”. See Van Inwagen (1990: Ch. 2). 
16 The first notion may be found in Eberle (1967) and Bostock (1979), the second in Tarski (1935) 
and Lewis (1991), the third in Simons (1987) and Casati and Varzi (1999).  
17 Given Reflexivity and Transitivity, the definiens in (11a) is equivalent to ∀w(Pzw ↔ (Pxw ∧ Pyw)). 
18 The non-extensional model of Fig. 3 also depicts a case in which x and y have a c-sum, in fact two c-
sums (themselves), though no a- or b-sum. This runs contrary the intended meaning of ‘sum’, sug-
gesting that (11c) is best suited to theories at least as strong as EM. See Hovda (2009) for discussion. 
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For each i ∈ {a, b, c}, we can then extend M by adding a corresponding axiom as fol-
lows, where again ξ specifies a suitable binary condition: 
(P.11i) ξxy → ∃zSizxy ξ-Sumi 
The non-equivalence of these axioms is immediately verified by taking ξ to be satis-
fied by all pairs of objects and considering the models in Fig. 6. But the axioms 
may also differ when ξ is more restrictive. For instance, with ξ expressing over-
lap, the model in Fig. 6, right, still satisfies (P.11c), but not (P.11a) or (P.11b), 
whereas the model in Fig. 7 satisfies (P.11a), but not (P.11b) or (P.11c). In EM, how-
ever, (P.11b) or (P.11c) are equivalent, since the corresponding notions of sum coin-
cide. 
 
Figure 7. A model of ξ-suma violating ξ-sumb and ξ-sumc. 
The intuitive force of each (P.11i) is in fact best appreciated in the context of EM, 
for in that case the relevant sums must be unique. If we introduce a corresponding 
binary operator (using ‘ι’ for the definite descriptor), 
(12i) x +i y =df ιzFizxy i-sum 
then is then easy to see that EM warrants all the “Boolean” properties one might ex-
pect. For instance, as long as the arguments satisfy the relevant condition ξ,19 each 
operator is idempotent, commutative, and associative: 
(13) x = x +i x 
(14) x +i y = y +i x 
(15) x +i (y +i z) = (x +i y) +i z 
and well-behaved with respect to parthood: 
(16) Px(x +i y) 
(17) Pxy → Px(y +i z) 
(18) P(x +i y)z → Pxz 
(19) Pxy ↔ x +i y = y 
                                                      
19 If the condition is not satisfied, the sum may not exist, in which case the standard treatment of de-
scriptive terms implies that the corresponding instances of the theorems that follow are false. In clas-
sical logic, (13)–(19) should therefore be taken to hold conditionally on the assumption that the rele-
vant variables range over ξ-related entities. 
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Each (P.11i) is still fairly weak, for it governs only finitary composition. We get even 
stronger composition principles by requiring a minimal underlapper to exist for any 
set of objects satisfying a given condition, including infinite sets (whose sums—or 
fusions—cannot be generated by means of the binary operators defined above). 
There is, of course, a technical obstacle to formulating such principles in their full 
generality without resorting to explicit quantification over sets, since a standard 
first-order language does not have the resources to specify all sets, but only a denu-
merable number (in any given domain).20 However, one can achieve a sufficient de-
gree of generality by relying on axiom schemas where the relevant sets are identified 
through open formulas. Thus, let ‘φ’ be any formula in the language, and let ‘ψ’ ex-
presses the condition in question. Infinitary variants of the three notions of sum in 
(11a)–(11c) can be defined as follows, respectively:
21 
(20a) Fazφw =df ∀w(φw → Pwz) ∧ ∀v(∀w(φw → Pwv) → Pzv) a-fusion 
(20b) Fbzφw =df ∀w(φw → Pwz) ∧ ∀v(Pvz → ∃w(φw ∧ Owv)) b-fusion 
(20c) Fczφw =df ∀v(Ovz ↔ ∃w(φw ∧ Owv)) c-fusion 
(‘Fizφw’ may be read as ‘z is an i-fusion of the φ-ers’.) For each such notion, we may 
then introduce a corresponding principle of infinitary fusion through the following 
axiom schema, which asserts the existence of an i-fusion (i ∈ {a, b, c}) for every non-
empty set of objects satisfying ψ: 
(P.12i) (∃wφw ∧ ∀w(φw → ψw)) → ∃zFizφw ψ-Fusioni 
It can be checked that each (P.12i) includes the corresponding finitary principle 
(P.11i) as a special case, taking ‘φw’ to be the formula ‘w = x ∨ w = y’ and ‘ψw’ the 
condition ‘(w = x → ξwy) ∧ (w = y → ξxw)’. Thus, again, these principles are pair-
wise distinct in M, though it turns out that in the presence of Strong Supplementation 
(P.12b) and (P.12c) are equivalent. 
Finally, the strongest versions of all these composition principles are obtained by as-
serting them as axiom schemas holding for every condition ψ, i.e., effectively, by 
foregoing any reference to ψ altogether. Formally this amounts in each case to drop-
ping the second conjunct of the antecedent of (P.12i), i.e., to asserting the schema 
expressed by the relevant consequent for any non-empty set of objects specifiable in 
the language: 
(P.13i) ∃wφw → ∃zFizφw Unrestricted Compositioni 
                                                      
20 To overcome this limitation, some early theories such as those of Tarski (1929) and Leonard and 
Goodman (1940) resort to explicit quantification over sets. Others, such as Lewis (1991), resort to 
the machinery of plural quantification. 
21 (20a)–(20c) are to be read on the assumption that the variables ‘z’ and ‘v’ do not occur free in φ. 
Similar restrictions will apply below. 
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Once again, the relative strength of these principles varies for each i ∈ {a, b, c}. In 
particular, it is noteworthy that adding (P.13b) to MM would suffice to warrant 
the equivalence of Weak and Strong Supplementation, (P.4) and (P.5), whereas adding 
(P.13c) would not (Fig. 4 would still count as a counteremodel). Given (P.5), how-
ever, the two composition principles are equivalent, which means that the theory 
obtained by adding every instance of (P.13b) to MM
22 is the same theory obtained by 
adding every instance of (P.13c) to EM. This theory is known in the literature as Gen-
eral Extensional Mereology, or GEM. The same theory can be obtained by extending 
MM with (P.13a), provided the following axiom is also added:
23 
(P.14) (Fazφw ∧ Pxz) → ∃w(φw ∧ Owx) Filtration  
4 Classical Mereology 
GEM is a powerful theory, and it was meant to be so by its nominalistic forerunners, 
who were thinking of mereology as a fundamental alternative to set theory.24 Indeed, 
GEM has such a distinguished pedigree that it has earned the title of Classical Mereolo-
gy. It is also a decidable theory, whereas for example M, MM, EM, and many exten-
sions thereof are not.25 To see just how powerful GEM is, consider the following 
operator, where ‘F’ is any of the ‘Fi’s defined above (which GEM forces to coincide): 
(21) σxφx =df ιzFzφx general fusion 
In terms of this operator—the fusion of all φ-ers—GEM can be further simplified, 
for example by merging (P.5) and (P.13c) into a single axiom schema: 
(P.13) ∃xφx → ∃z(z = σxφx) Unique Unrestricted Fusion 
and we can introduce the following definitions:  
(22) x + y =df σz(Pzx ∨ Pzy) sum26 
(23) x × y =df σz(Pzx ∧ Pzy) product 
(24) x – y =df σz(Pzx ∧ ¬Ozy) difference 
(25) ~x =df σz¬Ozx complement 
(26) U =df σzPzz universe 
The full strength of GEM can then be appreciated by considering that its models are 
closed under each of these notions, subject to the satisfiability of the relevant condi-
                                                      
22 Indeed, (P.2) and (P.4) would suffice. 
23 From Hovda (2009). 
24 See the classical works of Leśniewski (1927–1931) and Leonard and Goodman (1940).  
25 For a comprehensive picture of decidability in mereology, see Tsai (2013). 
26 In GEM, this definition is equivalent to (12i), for each i ∈ {a, b, c}. 
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tions. More exactly: the condition ‘¬OzU’ is unsatisfiable, so U cannot have a com-
plement. Likewise products are defined only for overlappers and differences only for 
pairs that leave a remainder. In all other cases, however, (22)–(26) yield perfectly 
well-behaved operators. Since such operators are the natural mereological analogues 
of the familiar set-theoretic operators, with ‘σ’ in place of set abstraction, it follows 
that the parthood relation axiomatized by GEM has essentially the same properties as 
the inclusion relation in standard set theory, modulo the absence of a null entity cor-
responding to the empty set. Indeed, P is virtually isomorphic to the inclusion rela-
tion restricted to the set of all non-empty subsets of a given set, which is to say a 
complete Boolean algebra with the zero element removed. We say ‘virtually’ be-
cause, strictly speaking, this is only true of stronger version of GEM in which infini-
tary sums are defined using explicit quantification over sets.27 For set-free formula-
tions that, like those considered here, strictly adhere to a standard first-order lan-
guage with a denumerable supply of open formulas, the isomorphism does not quite 
hold. However, this is only a minor limitation, and we can still characterize the ex-
act algebraic strength of GEM in as follows: any model of this theory is isomorphic 
to a Boolean subalgebra of a complete Boolean algebra with the zero element re-
moved (a subalgebra that is not necessarily complete if Zermelo-Frankel set theory 
with the axiom of Choice is consistent).28 
In this connection, two further points are worth stressing. First, the existence of a 
“null entity” which is part of everything—the analogue of the empty set—is not in 
principle incompatible with GEM. However, it is easy to see that the only models of 
GEM  with such an entity are trivial one-element models, owing to Weak Supplemen-
tation. It is for this reasons that the principles of Unrestricted Composition in (P.13i) are 
stated as conditionals warranting the existence of a fusion for any given non-empty set 
of φ-ers. Dropping such a proviso would have disastrous effects, for then the exist-
ence of a null entity—the null entity—would be guaranteed by taking ‘φw’ to be the 
condition ‘∀xPwx’. The only way around the disaster would be to revisit the non-
basic vocabulary by carefully distinguishing trivial cases of parthood and overlap (in-
volving the ubiquitous null entity) and non-trivial, genuine ones, as in 
(27) GPxy =df  Pxy ∧ ∃z¬Pxz genuine parthood 
(28) GOxy =df  ∃z(GPzx ∧ GPzy) genuine overlap 
and by reformulating all non-core axioms accordingly.29 In this way, one can actually 
arrive at a variant of GEM that inherits all the strength of a complete Boolean alge-
bra. Nonetheless, the philosophical import of such a theory would remain dubious. 
                                                      
27 As such, the result goes back to Tarski (1935: n. 4).  
28  See Pontow and Schubert (2006), Theorem 34, for details and proof. 
29 This strategy is not uncommon in the mathematically oriented literature; see again Pontow and 
Schubert (2006) for a comprehensive treatment. 
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Second, note that GEM is fully committed to the existence of U, a “universal entity” 
of which everything is part. This is not by itself a problem, barring any philosophical 
concerns about the gerrymendered nature of such an entity. It is, however, not 
without consequences. In particular, while GEM admits of models in which every-
thing is composed of atoms as well as “gunky” models in which everything divides 
forever, the necessary existence of U deprives GEM of any “junky” model in which 
everything composes forever. Thus, while GEM admits of both atomistic and atom-
less extensions, adding the Ascent principle (P.9) would immediately result in an in-
consistent theory. 
5 Summary of GEM 
For ease of reference, we conclude by summarizing the main axiomatizations of GEM 
mentioned above, with some rewriting of bound variables and dropping all redun-
dancies:30 
(I) (Pxy ∧ Pyz) → Pxz   Transitivity  (P.2) 
 PPxy → ∃z(PPzy ∧ ¬Ozx) Weak Supplementation  (P.4) 
 ∃xφx → ∃zFazφx Unrestricted Compositiona (P.13a) 
 (Fazφx ∧ Pyz) → ∃x(φx ∧ Oxy) Filtration (P.14) 
(II) (Pxy ∧ Pyz) → Pxz   Transitivity  (P.2) 
 PPxy → ∃z(PPzy ∧ ¬Ozx) Weak Supplementation  (P.4) 
 ∃xφx → ∃zFbzφx Unrestricted Compositionb (P.13b) 
(III) Pxx   Reflexivity  (P.1) 
 (Pxy ∧ Pyz) → Pxz Transitivity  (P.2) 
 Pxy ∧ Pyx) → x = y Antisymmetry (P.3) 
 ¬Pyx → ∃z(Pzy ∧ ¬Ozx) Strong Supplementation  (P.5) 
 ∃xφx → ∃zFczφx Unrestricted Compositionc  (P.13c) 
(IV) (Pxy ∧ Pyz) → Pxz   Transitivity  (P.3) 
 ∃xφx → ∃z(z = σxφx) Unique Unrestricted Fusion (P.13) 
 
 
 
                                                      
30 See also Simons (1987) and  Hovda (2009) for additional axiom sets. The elegant axiomatization in 
(IV) is essentially due to Tarski (1929), though the axioms are explicitly given only in the 1956 Eng-
lish translation 
